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THE RULE OF THE JUNGLE IN PAKISTAN: A CASE
STUDY ON CORRUPTION AND FOREST
MANAGEMENT IN SWAT
ABSTRACT
Corruption in the forest sector of Swat, Pakistan is impairing the sustainable
management of forest. We analyze corruption in a case study setting against
the backdrop of the reform options that are most often cited as possible
solutions. As we highlight in this study, the ‘crime and punishment’ approach
is not feasibly implemented if the overall institutional environment is weak.
Since countrywide overhaul of corruption through sweeping reform
programs, the other reform approach, is a difficult and lengthy task, there is a
need for an alternative kind of reform. In the case of a corruption-ridden
centralised forest management regime, institutional reform should move
away from enforcement of existing institutions and promote communal
management of natural resources by locals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Developing countries are often characterized by long-standing and severe environmental
problems, and lack institutional strength to tackle them effectively. Deforestation in
Pakistan is one case in point. The control of logging is fraught with difficulties since
formal institutions have little influence on the behaviour of individuals and organizations.
In this article, we analyse, in a case study setting, how corruption affects the management
of forests in Swat, Pakistan. While examining the factors that are conducive to corruption,
we will also highlight the difficulties of applying the standard policy prescriptions for
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dealing with corruption. Finally, we outline how strategies based on institutional change
at the local level can help improving the management regime and controlling corruption.
Pakistani state and society face challenges associated with the history of the country:
political instability, secessionist movements, lack of rule of the law, and shortage of basic
public services, just to mention a few. Deforestation is one of these challenges with
worrisome environmental, social, and economic consequences. Environmental services
provided by the forest include biodiversity, watershed protection, microclimate
regulation, amenity and services at the global level (Asian Development Bank, 2000;
Brown and Durst, 2003). Furthermore, the services provided by the forest are also
important for agricultural activities where the forests, apart from their role in keeping
watersheds, also prevent local climate change that can damage crops. The importance of
forests for the country was recognised when the extensive floods of 1992 were imputed to
deforestation and a commercial timber extraction ban was enacted in the same year (Rao
and Marwat, 2003). From the social point of view, another reason for interest in
deforestation is that poor communities extract a substantial share of their revenues from
the forest (Rafi Khan et al., 2006). The administrative resources available to the forest
sector are contended over the pressing needs mentioned above.
In virtually all countries, formal rules have been adopted in order to prevent depletion
of renewable natural resources. Where –like in Pakistan– deforestation is taking place,
institutional failure is self-evident: the de facto management of the forest contradicts the
de jure setting. In this case study we analyze the causes of institutional failure in the
protection of forests in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan, namely in
the Swat district. Statutory law rigorously constrains exploitation activities and the forest
department is in charge of enforcement, but idiosyncrasies between formal provisions and
actual institutions create open access of forests by loggers.
During the study corruption emerged as a fundamental contributor to the current
pattern of forest exploitation. Corruption is crucial in the deforestation process: at every
step of illegal logging bribes are disbursed, during the extraction of logs, their transport
and their marketing. As we will highlight in this study, the ‘crime and punishment’
approach (Becker, 1968), which prescribes increase of monitoring activities and harsher
punishments in order to decrease corruption, is not easily implemented if the overall
institutional environment is not supportive. Countrywide overhaul of corruption, based on
sweeping reforms, is a difficult and lengthy task, which is seldom accomplished
(Kaufmann et al., 2005). Analysing corruption in a case study setting induces to look for
institutional reforms that are limited to a specific sector and that do not require farreaching institutional change. Even though corruption is often cited in reports and articles
about illegal logging, we find that there is a lack of case studies on corruption that put it
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in the institutional context and use an economic framework for suggesting reform.2 In our
study, corruption will be analysed in a new institutional economics framework, where the
focus will be on transaction costs and enforcement costs of property rights.
Corruption is endemic to many developing countries but Pakistan always features in
the highest positions in the rankings that are produced by international organizations (e.g.
Kaufmann et al., 2005; Transparency International, 2004). In Pakistani society the
phenomenon of corruption is particularly pervasive and affects also the operations of law
and enforcement agencies (police and the judiciary) (Transparency International, 2002).
Surveys, realized by international organizations with the intent of comparison across
countries, indicate that members of law enforcement agencies are among the main
offenders in corruption cases. The ‘abuse of power in order to serve private interest’, the
common definition of corruption (e.g. Lambsdorff, 2004), is widespread also in the
forestry sector of Pakistan. The difficulty of monitoring civil servants operating in remote
areas, and the general corruptibility of Pakistani public administration contribute to the
prevalence of corruption in the forest sector. Also during our study, through interviews
with informed agents, we collected witness evidence about employees of the forest
department and of the forest development corporation (that is, the agencies in charge of
enforcement in the forest sector) being involved in corruption in the forestry sector (see
also Rafi Khan et al., 2006).
Due to the fact that environmental problems require active public policies to be eased,
it is not a surprise to find that countries that are in institutional disarray are not successful
in dealing with environmental issues. Many of the benefits produced by the forest are
public goods whose production requires successful coordination of the efforts of several
individuals (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993). Nevertheless, institutional failures at the
national level do not always lead to environmental disruption and unsustainable resource
use. For example, Ostrom (1990) reports a list of cases where natural resources are
managed sustainably, as commons, by local communities. Many of these success stories
are from developing countries characterized by countrywide institutional disarray. It
appears then that institutions managing specific natural resource, when members of local
communities coordinate effectively, can be successful even when the national
institutional setting is problematic. These findings entail that local institutional

2

Existing studies serve, for example, the purpose of highlighting cases of officials and individuals
involved in illegal logging in order to push authorities to intervene (e.g. Environmental Investigation
Agency and Telapak, 2001). The lack of case studies can be caused by the difficulties of getting
information on illegal operations. Already Myrdal (1968) mentioned that corruption is ``almost taboo
as a research topic [...], revealing a general bias that we have characterised as diplomacy in research”.
Even though research on corruption has largely expanded in recent years, case studies involving
fieldwork can still be affected by diplomacy in research; for instance, Perry (1997) still finds corruption
to be taboo in geography.
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frameworks could achieve sustainable development even though the country as a whole is
characterised by institutional shortfalls.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review of studies of
corruption and environmental policies, analysis levels of corruption in Pakistan and
highlights the conditions for successful communal management; and introduces the
theoretical framework; Section 3 describes geography and institutions in the case study
area; Section 4 describes the dynamics producing deforestation; Section 5 summarises the
ongoing reform process, underlines its shortfalls and possible improvements of the
process. Section 6 concludes.

2. INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
In this section we review the literature on corruption and the environment, discuss the
incidence of corruption in Pakistan, we highlight the theoretical underpinning of the
study, and outline the conditions that enhance communal management of natural
resources.

2.1 Corruption and the environment
Environmental degradation requires mechanisms of social coordination to be corrected,
but successful involvement of the government is difficult to obtain. Those who have
vested interests in the current state of affairs will use their power to arrest institutional
change (grand corruption) and enforcement at the lower level by civil servants will be
ineffective (petty corruption). In this section, we briefly summarize existing evidence of
the role that corruption has on the environment; in the next section we outline corruption
incidence in the agencies most directly involved in the implementation and enforcement
of forestry policies in Pakistan: the police, the judiciary, and the forest department.
Even though evidence over the spread of corruption is difficult to obtain because of
the secrecy surrounding corruption deals, some empirical studies have been produced
over the effect of corruption on environmental policies’ formulation and implementation.
Furthermore, a large number of case studies and reports confirm how corruption
compromises the implementation of environmental regulations.
In a cross-country empirical analysis, Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2006) using two
indicators of environmental policy stringency and numerous control variables, find that
corruption is one of the main determinants of the level of environmental protection across
countries. Theoretical papers on corruption and environmental policy include Lopez and
Mitra, 2000 and Damania, 2002. Studies focusing on corruption in the forest sector
include The World Bank’s (Callister, 1999) report on corruption and forestry, reports on
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illegal logging in Indonesia (Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak, 2001;
2003) and Robbins (2000) that uses a theoretical framework for the analysis of corruption
and then applies it to a natural reserve in Rajastan, India Finally, Rosenbaum (2005), after
maintaining that corruption promotes illegal logging and trade, presents a list of lessons
for reforming the sector which are drawn from Transparency International’s toolbox for
fighting corruption. Transparency International promotes national integrity systems that
are a series of interventions at the national level for decreasing corruption. Rosenbaum
borrows some tools from the national integrity system for the forest sector in order to
create a list of interventions for reducing corruption in the forest sector. These
interventions include creating a knowledge center, creating a forest sector corruption
index, promoting awareness campaigns, encouraging forest certification, etc.

2.2 Evidence on the extent of corruption in Pakistan
The public administration of Pakistan is plagued by corruption. Even though hard
evidence of corruption’s incidence is difficult to obtain, surveys, news reports, case
studies, historical accounts, and information collected during our study all indicate that
corruption is pervasive at all levels. Islam, in his study of the Pakistani public service
states, “Corruption in Pakistan is a way of life” (2004: 314). It is the National
Accountability Bureau, a governmental agency in charge of drafting the National AntiCorruption Strategy, that states: “Corruption has become a disease infecting every aspect
of political, social and economic activity” (Hafiez, 2002: 1). In order to be able to better
place the forest sector in its institutional environment, in this sub-section, we will focus
on the evidence of corruption in the agencies most directly involved in the
implementation and enforcement of forest policy and regulations: the judiciary, the
police, and the forest department.
The extent of corruption in Pakistani’s enforcement agencies is evident from the
results of an extensive household survey conduced by Transparency International (2002).
During the survey 3000 households from urban and semi-urban areas of Pakistan have
been interviewed. A high share of respondents declared that at least one member of the
household had to deal with the police, or the judiciary in the previous year (32%, and 6%,
respectively). Most strikingly, all of those interviewed who had had contact with the
police reported corruption (that is 960 respondents out of the total sample of 3000).
According to the survey results, corruption – while dealing with the police – took several
forms, including outright extortion perpetrated by police officers and payments required
to be released from arbitrary imprisonment. Among those who dealt with the judiciary,
96% reported corruption. In most cases court employees and judges demanded bribes, but
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corruption in the law sector is so widespread that it was not uncommon to bribe also the
opponent’s lawyer and the public persecutor.
Corruption’s incidence, in the police department and in the judiciary, is all the more
important to understand the effect of corruption on forest management. In fact, the
success of enforcement tasks delegated to the forest department, in cases where there is
violence or complaints are taken to the courts, depends also on the collaboration of these
enforcement agencies.
As for the forest department itself, anecdotal evidence of corruption abounds. During
the fieldwork several interviews (with members of the local communities, with NGOs,
but also with members of the forest department) provided evidence of corruption.
Steimann (2004), in his detailed analysis of the structure of the forest department, finds
that forest guards levy fines in a entirely arbitrary fashion, and in most case they result in
a bribe. It appears that the lower ranks of the forest department are completely oblivious
of the Forest Ordinance (that should regulate many of their responsibilities, including
fining) and they are not aware of the formal regime of fines (let alone being willing or
able to properly enforce them).
The incentive structure faced by the employees of the forest department determines
their likelihood to collude. We must mention, among the factors that determine forest
guards’ behaviour, that wages of the lower rank employees of the forest department are
around or below the survival line for those who have to support a large family. Under
these economic circumstances, turning a blind eye on illegal logging and collecting bribes
looks like a necessary addition to a meagre salary (for a study of wages levels and
corruption see Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001).3 Another factor influencing the
behaviour of enforcement agents is that conflicts in the area turn easily to violence and
these conflicts have involved forest guards in the past. Duty-related incidents have
resulted in serious injuries and, in a few cases, also in the death of forest officials
(Steimann, 2004). Conflict makes the cooperation of the police and the judiciary even
more essential, because the lack of cooperation weakens the position of the forest
department in relation to timber smugglers. The fact that, as mentioned above,
cooperation from other enforcement agencies is absent contributes to the prevalence of
corruption in the forest department.4

3

Forest guards need wood for heating purposes, but they are not given allowances to purchase it
legally. This makes them dependent on, at least part of, the wood that is being logged illegally.
4
Reportedly the forest department has been asked in several occasions to allow smuggling of timber
directed to judges and prosecutors in order to obtain cooperation by the judiciary.
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2.3 Methodological framework
The theoretical framework utilized in this study of corruption and forest management is
based on the new institutional economics approach. We will look at the way institutions
constrain choices of economic agents (North, 1990). In the context of formal institutions,
corruption represents a weakening of constraints: disbursing bribes facilitates operations
that are inconsistent with legal institutions. Institutions, apart from constraining
behaviour, define also opportunities. In some circumstances, however, to exploit the
prospects offered by the legal system bribes need to be paid (e.g. when locals have to pay
inducements in order to extract logs for self-consumption). In order to understand the
failure of formal institutions to influence economic agents’ behaviour, we will focus on
transaction costs and more specifically on enforcement costs of property rights.5, 6
A relevant category of costs is transaction costs: the costs that occur when a bundle of
rights (related to a good or service) is transferred across economic agents (Coase, 1960).
One stage of activity ends and another begins (Williamson, 1985). When, as in Swat, de
facto property regimes do not coincide with legal provisions, also illegal costs – such as
bribing – are part of the costs of the transaction. Enforcement costs are a sub-category of
transaction costs and pertain to the expenses occurred in order to put into effect property
rights.
Enforcement costs of de jure institutional settings are a key for understanding the
evolution of natural resources management and its likelihood to fail. In the case of the
forest, the enforcement of property rights entails guarding it and monitoring extractive
activities. The legislator in Pakistan opted for a forest management regime characterised
by pervasive control by state agents. The state and its agencies should effectively monitor
all forestry operations. Enforcement costs of the regime are prohibitive and the system
has proven unattainable.
Different property regimes entail different rights (and duties) for economic agents and
have implications for the management of the resource.7 The formal property regime of
most of the forest in Swat is state property, with some rights given to local communities
and former owners and the enforcement is based on state agencies (primarily the forest
department).
In the rest of the article we assess the working of existent management regime to
diagnose the reasons of the failures. However, focusing only on the failures of the current
5

For a detailed account of the theoretical framework adopted during the research see Pellegrini and
Kruseman, 2005.
6
Transaction costs can be imputed in a variety of ways to different agents. Bromley (1989) has shown
that the distribution of transaction costs influences distributional and environmental outcomes.
7
For a comprehensive overview of bundles of rights associated with property right regimes see
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992.
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regime would not be very useful. Hence, in this section we also summarize theoretical
and empirical underpinnings of an alternative management system that we suggest to
explore: common property management.
While reviewing the findings of studies completed over the last few decades, Ostrom
(2000) summarizes the conditions that increase the probability of successful communal
management. These conditions relate both to characteristics of the resource and of the
appropriators. With respect to the resource, the likelihood of successful management as a
common is enhanced if improvement is feasible, reliable indicators of the condition of the
resource are available, the flow of resources is predictable, and forest boundaries are
clear. Parts of the forest of Swat are so degraded that improvements to its stock are
feasible only over a medium to long period of time, but most of the other conditions are
met: the state of the forest is directly observable, the regenerative potential is predictable
and communities’ boundaries are mostly undisputed. With respect to the appropriators,
the conditions are: resource saliency for the users, common understanding, low discount
rate for the agents, trust and reciprocity in the community, autonomy (e.g. the
appropriators are able to rule themselves), and prior organizational experience. These
conditions are the ones that are the most difficult to meet in Swat. Adherence to these
conditions is heterogeneous: some communities meet most of the conditions, while others
are more deficient. Generally, saliency and shared understanding are the conditions that
will be met more easily: income in rural communities is very low and resources extracted
from the forest make up a large share of income (Rafi Khan et al., 2006), the forest
standing has a predictable evolution and communities’ members are aware of its
functioning. Discount rates are not particularly low because incomes are meagre and there
is migration. Trust and reciprocity and previous organizational experience are contingent
on each community, on its social cohesion and its history. Autonomy is absent in the
present situation, but that is the condition to achieve in case of institutional change
towards communal management.
Overall, the conditions mentioned above affect the individual agents’ cost benefit
calculations of engaging in communal management (Ostrom, 2000). Policy interventions
that promote communal management should include instruments to promote these
conditions in order to enhance the likelihood of success. It is worth reminding the reader
that these conditions are not a list of necessary and sufficient conditions. There is also an
important role for individuals in the setting up of commons’ management mechanisms.
The uncoordinated activities of individual members of local communities are partially
unpredictable and make it impossible to be entirely certain of the outcome of their
interaction. Furthermore, once we consider self-organization in a longer temporal
framework, it is important to emphasize that social systems are dynamic and evolve over
time, therefore though the local community is not self organizing at one point in time it
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can develop in that direction at a later stage. Learning can make a community able to
copy other communities’ solutions, or to adapt them to their own socio-environmental
conditions. Summing up, the list of conditions mentioned above can be considered as a
benchmark for estimating the likelihood to achieve successful coordination in a common
over the short period, or objectives to be achieved as an intermediate step toward
effective communal management.
Finally, as mentioned above, the transition to communal management can also be
problematic and give way to a situation where the poorest members of the community
continue being marginalized. It is important to note that local communities are not
homogeneous. Individuals, within the community, can try to extract as much resources as
possible, depending on their power (Garcia-Frapolli, 2004) and initiatives encouraging
self-organization can easily be hijacked by commanding agents (Rola and Coxhead,
2005). Hence, the end results of policies promoting communal management should be
carefully monitored (especially at the implementation stage) and they cannot be assumed
a success.

3. A PROFILE OF SWAT, PAKISTAN
For the understanding of dynamics of deforestation in Swat, it is important to describe the
physical and human geography of the study area, and the institutional settings
characterizing it.

3.1 Geography and ecology
Pakistani forest endowment is dwindling. In the decade 1990-2000, the deforestation rate
for the whole country was 1.5% per year (Brown and Durst, 2003). Once we consider that
only a minute part of Pakistan is forested (around 3% of the total area), the trend is even
more compelling. The North West Frontier Province (one of four that compose Pakistan)
contains the largest amount of forest (around 40% of the total, Government of Pakistan,
1992). Our case study focused on an area that traditionally was mostly covered by forest
and still contains significant tracts of forest, but is also marked by deforestation: the Swat
district.8
The Swat valley is named after the river that runs through it and it includes several sub
valleys. At the lower end of the valley, there is the district capital, Mingora, which is also

8

The North West Frontier Province has a set up that was instituted during the British colonial rule. The
Province is divided in divisions, themselves divided into districts. The Malakand division contains the
Malakand, Swat, Dir, and Citral districts. Apart from the districts, The North West Frontier Province
also contains Federally Administered Tribal Areas, where federal and provincial government have very
limited powers (mostly limited to military incursions related to terrorism and drug activities).
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the most important urban agglomerate. From there, moving northwards along the valley,
lower plains with agriculture and fruit orchards are the dominant land use. Moving higher
up in the valley, with the increasing altitude, forests, alpine pastures, and perennial
glaciers take the place of agricultural activities. The settlements decrease in size going up
the valley. Transport infrastructures become scarcer and most of the transport to the
villages nearest to the glaciers is on foot.
The forest standing in this district is of special interest because it is one of the most
dense of Pakistan, because of the ecological diversity within its boundaries, because the
area is very poor and the poor are dependent on resources and income coming from the
forest, and because the watershed is large and influences the water basin of various
hydropower stations.

3.2 History and institutions
History is at the root of the status quo and it shapes expectations (claims and rights). The
history of Swat has a bearing on current land tenure and forest management, because
historical developments are at the origin of the right holding of heirs of the most
important families allied to the local dictator. In this section we will outline the historical
evolution leading to the modern management regime.
Swat has a distinct history in relation to Pakistan and the rest of the Indian subcontinent. While the rest of the area was colonised by the British crown, Swat succeeded
in conserving its autonomy and, once Pakistan became independent in 1947, it did not
fully accede to Pakistan until 1969.9

3.2.1

Pre accession

The earlier history of Swat (from the end of the 19th century) was marked by the
emergence of a political structure characterised by the extensive powers of the autocrat.
The dictator, called Wali, was leading a rebellious country and needed the support of
allies from the powerful families of Swat in order to defend the Princely State of Swat (as
the state was officially called before the accession to Pakistan). Challenges to the state
came from external powers (the British and the neighbouring Kalam state) and from
internal ones (other local leaders trying to seize power) (Sultan-i-Rome, 2005). As a
result, the rulers were under continuous threat and they were used to build alliances with
wealthy local lords.
The history of the Wali is especially important for the management of the forest,
because natural resources were valuable assets used for building and keeping alliances,

9

For an account of Swat’s resistance to outsiders occupation and interference see Lindholm, 1990.
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thus their exploitation was crucial to the survival of the regime. The management system
compounded harsh punishments to those who illegally encroached on the forest, while
allowing favouritism and smuggling when such was in the Wali’s – or his allies’ –
benefit. The decision power, with respect to logging and forest exploitation, was
centralised and rested in the hands of the Wali. 10

3.2.2

Post accession

The accession to Pakistan of the Princely State of Swat swiftly changed the institutional
setting. The national state took under its control the management and exploitation of
forests. The law provided only for a minute disbursement of royalties (10% of the total
net revenues) to be paid to the legal right holders and established some extraction rights
for local communities to meet consumption needs of the residents.
Pakistani state’s forest management was, from the very beginning, characterized by a
command and control approach but the effective enforcement was beyond the state’s
capability.11 The post-accession regime implied that most of the forests were declared
reserved or protected, i.e. the management regimes strictly constrained exploitation
rights.12 Ownership and management rested in the hands of the state, through the forest
department. In the reserve forest, no cutting is allowed and members of the local
community have limited rights for extracting dry wood and non-timber forest products. In
protected forest, the forest department is in charge of the management plan and at times
when there are cuttings, the forest development corporation is in charge of the cutting of
marked timber, but shares of the net sales revenues are given to right holders (Steimann,
2004). Moreover, a “local quota” of timber is reserved to local residents for their needs
and there is an “emergency quota” that can be used under special circumstances, e.g. to
rebuild a house after a fire. 13
The shares of revenues from wood sales directed to right holders have been increasing
over time, from 10% at the time of accession, to 60% nowadays. Those entitled to shares
10

For a detailed historical account of the autocratic rule of the Wali of Swat, the strictness of the
application of the law to the commoners, the importance that forestry had under his rule, and the illegal
cutting and favours for his allies (the Khans) see Sultan-i-Rome, 2005. For an altogether different
version of the Wali’s rule see his autobiography (Barth, 1985).
11
Pakistan was not the only state that tried to control the forest sector without the necessary resources
to implement its own rules on the face of high transaction costs. For comparison see Ostrom (1990) on
Nepal.
12
A third category of forests are the guzara forests. They are those whose property was left to the
communities, even though relevant management responsibilities were taken over by the forest
department. Guzara forest is an institutional setup that characterized almost no forest in our study area.
13
For a detailed description of legal status and management provisions in the forest of the whole of the
North West Frontier Province see Steimann, 2004.
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of the royalties of the forest are the land owners (mostly Khans families – the former
allies of the Wali) that reside far away from the forest, or local communities, depending
on the property situation of the forest at the time it was taken over by the state.14
The state has been incapable to implement the management regime outlined above,
and together with the dismantlement of the previous regime of property rights, this has
led to an open access regime.15 Additionally, the gap between de jure and de facto
management of the forest created multiple bases for claiming rights on the forest: the
statutory law, custom, and the de facto regime.16 Agents can then refer to competing
bases to justify their claims according to their interests (i.e. there is forum shopping)
(Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002).
The open access regime on the forest implies that landowners and local residents
exploiting the forest are only restrained by local power relations. An unabridged gap
persists between the regulatory framework and the actual management practices.
Encroachments and illegal cuttings continue. Furthermore, legal disputes over the
cuttings’ royalties abound and court decisions settling them are delayed (at times for
decades), and, in many cases, court decisions are still pending.
The operations of the forest department have not become more functional to date.17
Corruption is widespread and it affects all the operations of the forest department. Forest
guards are paid salaries that cannot satisfy the needs of families (Steimann, 2004) and
they are lacking the support of the other enforcement agencies (which, as we saw above,
are themselves inefficient and plagued by corruption). The overall enforcement system
seems more geared to make ends meet for forest officials, than to protect the forest. There
are numerous check-posts along the roads going down the Swat Valley, but these serve
little purpose apart from extracting bribes in exchange for turning a blind eye on timber
smugglers.18

14

Property rights over the forest are contested and contention over property rights is a source of endless
litigations that are dealt by Pakistan’s corrupt and inefficient judiciary system.
15
Dismantling existing institutions for the management of natural resources without succeeding in
creating new ones has been a common procedure in many developed and developing countries over the
last few decades.
16
Customs and de facto regimes can differ because the former borrows legitimacy from the tradition,
while the former is simply the current state of affairs.
17
We collected information through focus group discussions and interviews during the fieldwork.
Different sources, including employees of the forest department itself, confirmed the dismal state of the
forest department operations.
18
This was confirmed by numerous interviews and by our own witnessing the ease of movement of
truckloads of illegal logs in thorough the valley.
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4. 4 DEFORESTATION IN SWAT, PAKISTAN
Deforestation in Swat is taking place because of institutional failure. Formal rules, if
applied, could protect the forests, but de facto alternative institutions and lack of effective
monitoring and implementations forbade them to be effective.19 At the level of economic
agents, deforestation is caused by the desire to convert land for agriculture and/or for the
extraction of the valuable logs (Bromley, 1999). In this section we analyse how the most
important incentives interact with the institutional framework determining the status quo.
The process of deforestation is different in different sites according to differences in
socio-economic and ecological conditions, and also local institutional settings are diverse
in the case study area. The same formal institutions produce different environmental
outcomes and causes different social agreements to arise depending on local conditions.
Under current conditions sustainable management of the forest is achieved only rarely. It
is worth stressing that, as we will see, not only logging, but also those cases of effective
forest protection operations contradict the formal regulatory framework.

4.1 Incentives and institutions over the forests of Swat
The occurrence of deforestation depends on local physical and social conditions.
Incentives and institutions interact with geography because of geography’s effects on
transaction costs. Below we provide a classification of institutional regimes that are in
place in Swat.
At the bottom of the valley, in the most fertile area, land conversion for agriculture has
historically been the main cause of deforestation. Over time forested areas have been
cleared to make space for agricultural production and fruit orchards. Deforestation in the
area, which is historically important, has lost significance. At the bottom of the valley
land conversion is almost complete and there are no large stretches of standing forest left.
Property rights in this part of the valley are well established, especially since easy access
diminishes enforcement costs. Historical patterns determined land ownership to be
concentrated in the hands of the Khans families (see section 3.2 above).
Agricultural activities at the bottom of the valley are the most valuable of the area and
they are the most damaged by the ongoing deforestation taking place uphill. During our
interviews several stakeholders noted microclimatic change (especially increases of hail
precipitation) and problems from the watershed of the Swat River (floods and erosion)
that damage agricultural activities. These problems were linked to the deforestation
process.

19

In our study we do not investigate the issue of underlying and proximate causes of deforestation. For
an in depth discussion see Bromley, 1999 and Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000.
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In the mid and upper valley, a lack of enforcement of property rights on forested areas
determined a de facto open access situation in most of the forest. The state and the right
holders – the former landowners20 (mostly the Khans residing at the bottom of the valley)
– are formally entitled to the ownership and to shares of revenues arising from forest
cuttings, but lack of enforcement allows members of local communities and timber
smugglers to consider the forest as an open access resource and to exploit it accordingly.
Formally, the forest department (representing the provincial government) and the
landowners (that reside at the bottom of the valley) have control over the forest. Under
the formal management scheme a quota of wood is reserved for the local community for
its needs, and the net revenues that accrue when there are cuttings are shared among the
right holders (i.e. the former owners of the forest) and the forest department. The formal
institutional setting, which remains unenforced, is not substituted by an alternative regime
restricting access to the forest.
The forest department and the forest development corporation, at times when markings
and cuttings are allowed, collude with loggers and allow more wood to be extracted than
the amount planned. This illegal extraction damages right holders and the local
community, depriving of royalties the former, of self-consumption opportunities the
latter, and of environmental services both.21
Illegal logging takes place also when there is no marking and organized logging: locals
log more than they are allowed because their quota are insufficient, or because of the
lengthy process involved in obtaining their share of the local quota, or they extract logs
for commercial purposes (mostly in connection with the timber mafia, whose members
are reported to be the hard-to-trace). When timber is logged and transported, chances of
running into a control from forest officials is high and the unauthorized logging is
punished with a fine or a bribe.22
In summary, the area is characterised by a failure to organize forms of control by the
state or by the local community. In the mid-valley, the local community is not involved in

20

The rightholders are the formal landowners, because with the accession of Sat to Pakistan the formal
property of forests passed to the state and the former owner enjoyed the right to a share of the revenues
from logs extraction.
21
Sources of information on illegal operations are: cross-checked confidential interviews with people
belonging to different stakeholders groups (i.e. forest department, law scholars, members of elders’
council), group discussions, and household surveys.
22
The regulatory framework that should guide the operations of forest officials is so confused that
different officials interpret their duties differently. As a result, often the difference between a fine and a
bribe becomes fuzzy. For example, when interviewed, different forest officials answer differently on
whether fines should be paid on the spot, or fines should be reported first, and then paid at the office of
the range officer; also the amount of the fine to be levied varies markedly depending on the respondent
and it is unclear what should be done with confiscated timber (reportedly some forest officers keep it in
order to smuggle it, or for their own benefit). For a detailed exposition, see Steimann, 2004.
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monitoring and regulation of the exploitation activities. One of the factors contributing to
this situation is the lack of trust and of social capital in the communities23. Competing
stakeholders exploit the forest in an unsustainable manner. Every agent would benefit
from a collective management of the forest, but cannot reap the benefits of its restraint.
Without a credible coordination mechanism and a fair property regime, they would not
appropriate any value of the natural resource in any case. The dominant strategy is thus to
harvest as much as possible resulting in a logging race typical of the so-called tragedy of
the commons (Hardin, 1968). Thus, neither the management practices of the Forest
Department, nor the management practices of the local community point towards
sustainable extraction. The elimination of trees from the steep slopes causes soil erosion
and slides. As a result, problems of land degradation are evident in the whole area.
The only examples of sustainable forest management and effective enforcement of
restraints of extraction activities are those that arose from spontaneous initiatives of local
citizens, or centered on locals’ activities, but in cooperation with the forest department.
Local groups of citizens at various times have been organizing themselves in order to
defend some stretches of forest from exploitation. The most effective way that has been
found to enforce extraction restrictions was with limits on the transport of logs:
community-manned check posts have been set-up and timber loads have been blocked
along the roads (Killeen and Khan, 2001; Khan et al., 2004). Other efforts to protect the
forest involved local communities in concert with the forest department. The ones that
were initiated under the donor-sponsored initiatives include community manned check
posts, patrols from the local community guarding the forests, join patrols of community
and forest department members and have been associated with improvements in forest
cover (Steimann, 2004; Suleri, 2002).
In summary, in the Swat district, the inconsistency between different regulatory
frameworks create a situation of legal pluralism: there is a plethora of different rules that
are contending the governance of transactions. Each agent turns to the regulatory
framework that is more convenient for her and neglect others’ claims (Meinzen-Dick and
Pradhan, 2002). In most of the area rather than the official management regime, centred
on the control of the forest department, a open access situation is in place.

5. STRATEGIES FOR INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

23

During our meetings members of the community repeatedly asserted that they were not interested in
the management of the forest, that they wanted these tasks to be supplied by the forest department and
that all they want are shares of the revenues when marking and extraction takes place.
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Considering institutional arrangements as fixed and simply working from a ‘crime and
punishment’ perspective (Becker, 1968) the most obvious solution to the enforcement
problem would be to alter the cost-benefit outcomes for forest officials of entering into
corruption deals, and of loggers harvesting illegally. When applied to corruption in the
forest department, this would imply increasing the penalties for employees of the forest
service caught for being involved in corruption and augmenting monitoring in order to
identify more corruption cases. With respect to illegal loggers, this approach requires
higher fines and increasing monitoring in the collection and transport of logs.
The successful application of the crime and punishment approach relies on the
existence

of

enforcement

agencies

that

operate

efficiently

and

honestly.

Recommendations based on this approach must take into account the institutional settings
where they would be applied. However, in Pakistan the highly corrupted police and
judiciary cannot patrol effectively the forest department. In turn the corrupt employees of
the forest department cannot effectively monitor the behaviour of other agents.
Furthermore, examples of sustainable management of the forest exist in the area, but
they are not based on the state’s control of the forest, nor on better enforcement (or
harsher rule) by the forest department. On the contrary, the only successful cases of
sustainable management are based on collective action of local people and do not rely on
the official enforcement agency (i.e. the forest department). In light of these findings, in
this section we will outline the ongoing reform process, underlining its idiosyncrasies and
setbacks. Finally, we will suggest how the reform process could take a new spurt
reinforcing collective action where it is already in place, and facilitating it where it is not
happening.

5.1 The ongoing reform process
The unsustainability of de facto management practices and the environmental, social, and
economic shortcomings of current deforestation rates in most of the North West Frontier
Province are apparent and cause discontent voiced in numerous manners (e.g. the press
often laments the management regime and its effects). The social and environmental
failures associated with the current management practices have motivated some reform
attempts of the forestry sector. For the Swat district the most relevant reform effort was
the Forest Sector Strategy, whose incept was supported by a loan of the Asian
Development Bank and by technical assistance to the program provided by the Dutch
Royal Embassy.
The main task of this donor-driven program was to move the management of the forest
from a state of command and control towards co-management. The donors hoped to
strengthen the local capabilities and to move the emphasis of the forest department from
punishment towards partnership with local communities.
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The program was not successful. Local committees were established in several
villages, so that they could be an interlocutor of the forest department and, most
importantly, contribute to the village land use plan.24 However at the local level the most
influential members of the community controlled the process as the committees overrepresent the wealthy. Moreover, the forest department has been unwilling to give up part
of its powers and enter in a real partnership with the locals. Eventually, due to
implementation slowness and especially because of the resistance at the provincial level
to undertake the necessary steps to support the reform in due time, the support of donor
agencies has been withdrawn in 2004. This was a mayor setback, especially in the few
places where the reform started to yield benefits. Now, trust is lost in this type of
interventions (see Suleri, 2002).
The Forest Ordinance of 2002 confirmed that the reform process was not proceeding
smoothly. The inception of the ordinance was admirable. It was geared towards comanagement and partnership in a stable regulatory framework. However, under the
insistence of more conservative powers in the forest department and the provincial
government, the final result was only a compromise. Even Sungi, a Pakistani grass root
NGO working for the empowerment of the most marginal members of the society, which
from the beginning was supportive of the reform process, eventually rejected the Forest
Ordinance. Of special importance in determining Sungi’s stance were the punitive powers
that the ordinance gave to the forest department and that could be used against local
communities.
Since the donors’ support to the reform process was stopped, the whole process halted
and is reversed. The latest initiatives strengthen the forest department control of the forest
and, in accordance to the 2002 Forest Ordinance, the Forest Force has been instituted.25
Now a 500 men-strong armed force will patrol the forest of the North West Frontier
Province, including Swat. The forest department itself estimates that at least 3000 would
be required in order to patrol effectively the forest of the province.26 The insufficient
number of men involved in the force will be the likely excuse for another failure of the
‘crime and punishment’ approach applied to illegal logging.
It is also worth noting that if the existing force would be effective much less than 500
armed men would be necessary in order to control extraction activities in the area. Few
roads run along the valley and functioning check-posts should be sufficient to stop a large
part of the smuggling. Nevertheless, the guards manning the check posts are colluding
with the smugglers, and arming the very same guards will not change their incentive
24

The committees are the Village Development Committee (composed by men) and the Women
Organization (composed by women).
25
See http://www.ttjonline.com/story.asp?sc=35057.
26
The expected cost of equipping such a force would be of 60m Pakistani Rupees (or around 825,000
euros). See http://www.dawn.com/2004/06/16/local23.htm
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structure. Similarly, armed guards patrolling the forest, even more removed from
detection possibilities, will easily become involved in illegal deals. Arming forest
officials may not yield any environmental, economic or social dividends.

5.2 Institutional reforms
The other mainstream approach to reform, the “holistic approach”, is a countrywide
program of institutional change. For example, Transparency International asks for a
holistic approach based on national integrity systems (see Rosenbaum, 2005 for an
application to the forestry sector). Its implementation remains blocked because of
opposing powerful interests. In the case of Pakistan, completing the checklist of the
national integrity system (including independent judiciary, free press, establishing an
effective watchdog authority, etc.), would imply altering deeply the institutional
framework of the country (e.g. Yusuf, 2002). While the objective of decreasing
corruption occurrence in the whole of Pakistan remains valid, the ecological and social
problems caused by deforestation require viable initiatives to be adopted at a quick pace
in the forestry sector.27 Moreover, obtaining improvements and reducing corruption in
some spearhead sectors – such as the forestry – can help to create a momentum for wider
initiatives against corruption.28
Since, as discussed above, corruption is widespread in Pakistan, the officials from the
forest department operates within a system where effective collaboration of
complementary enforcement agencies is infeasible. Therefore, institutional change should
focus on a management regime that can be implemented mostly within the forestry sector.
The forestry sector, as it stands now, is characterised by pervasive powers given to
state’s agents and chronic corruption. Since, as delineated above, corruption is endemic to
the Pakistani public sector, institutional reform should reduce state’s involvement in
planning, management, and enforcement of forest policies. As mentioned above,
institutional arrangements that rely on local communities can halt deforestation.
Where property rights are well established the reform process should be very careful
with altering the existing situation as it could lead to open access conditions. Where
private property is undisputed a system of market-based incentives would be supportive
for the internalization of the positive externalities arising from the forest. As we explained
27

For an analysis of how social action coalitions can produce and sustain anti corruption efforts see
Johnston and Kpundeh, 2005.
28
The National Integrity System (NIS) has also been applied specifically to the forest sector
(Rosenbaum, 2005), but its application in Pakistan seems doubtful. Some of the most important tools of
NIS involve the partnership of commercial forest interests and the public sector (e.g. forest integrity
pacts and business principles for the forest sector). In Pakistan commercial logging is formally
inexistent (because of the ban), therefore there is no legal basis for a partnership between the
commercial sector and the state.
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above, at the bottom of the valley, the avoidance of deforestation is not an issue as those
areas have been already entirely cleared from the forest.
Where communal efforts to protect the forest are in place – and deforestation is not
occurring – a strengthening of the current institutional settings should take place, aligning
the de jure to the existing situation. In this way the long-term management perspective of
communities can be improved through stability.
Where institutions are not well defined the task of reform is more difficult. The
impediments to the self-organization of the collective must be removed and social
learning must take place, which can be a lengthy process. The broader institutional
environment, especially the forest department, should operate as a facilitator in the
process (Ostrom et al., 1999).
At the same time, it is important to recognize that local communities can also fail to
manage in an equitable and sustainable manner the natural resource. Differentiation
within communities, because of wealth, power and/or of ethnicity, can mean that the most
influential members of the community can hijack the devolution process and the
collective action process, turning it into their favour (Suleri, 2002; Rola and Coxhead,
2005). Social trust and self-organization capability are required and, if they are not
present, time and good examples will be required to build them. Hence, special attention
should be devoted to monitoring and implementation.
Summing up, when it is needed to think about institutional change for the management
of the forest, to overcome failures of a present system, it is important to accommodate
local ecological conditions and social capabilities. Thus, institutional set ups cannot be
uniform, but need built-in flexibility and accurate monitoring of achievements and
failures.

5.3 Paths of change
In the context of institutional change, a particular emphasis should be given to the
building of coalitions that can support change. After highlighting the needed steps for
change, in this section we outline possible patterns to achieve change, through an analysis
of the incentives of the most important stakeholders. Finally, we will outline some of the
auxiliary reforms and federal level initiatives that could facilitate the reform process and
the achievement of the final objective of sustainable forest management.

5.3.1

Actors and incentives

The main actors with stakes in the forestry sector are the federal and provincial
governments, the forest department, the forest development corporation, local
communities (differentiated among themselves mostly because of right-holding issues),
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NGOs, and international donors. All these actors have some qualified interest in forest
conservation. Additionally, there are the interests of those involved in illegal logging, the
smugglers, the wood processing industry, and the economic agents involved in economic
activities induced by timber trade. Thanks to corruption, they are able to influence some
of the other actors as well.
If change is offered as a package the main losers could get a compensation for their
losses. This compensation would ease opposition and the actual change would be more
likely to happen. We identify as the main losers from the achievement of sustainable
management the local notables who are right-holders and would loose part of their rights
if management would be moved to the local community. Another potential loser is the
forest department which would suffer in terms of power, routines and, for certain
officials, relevant shares of their income (now provided by kickbacks). Last, we will look
at those directly involved in the illegal timber trade.
Federal and Provincial Government have important stakes in forestry. The federal
government is ultimately in the position to decide the overall legal framework and it
should be in the position to allow for the internalization of positive externalities created
by the forest. The provincial government can also influence the legal framework (within
the boundaries set by the federal government) and is the recipient of a share of the
royalties produced when legal logging takes place. The situation is further complicated
because there are discrepancies between the government’s mandate and the interest of
agents acting in the name of the government. From the perspective of the government as a
whole, the conservation of forest resources would have the advantage of increasing
welfare levels, ease the pressure on the issue exercised by mass medias and political
discontent, and attract donors. Nevertheless, from confidential interviews with high-rank
members of the forest department and of NGOs, it was revealed that important figures in
the government (mostly at the provincial level) have stakes in illegal logging.
Forest department and the forest development corporation have as stated main
objectives the management and protection of the forest cover, and sustainable extraction
and fair repartition of royalties. Apart from their official missions it is apparent that
employees of these organizations have developed routines that are not oriented towards
conservation of the forest, but towards appropriation of shares of revenues that are
derived from illegal logging. Increasing the meagre salaries — as a substitute of actual
kickbacks — and training of the lower ranks of the forest department are preconditions
for having the forest department and the forest development corporation playing a
positive role in the forestry sector. Moreover, the forest department as a whole should be
more involved in the reform process.29
29

At least the forest guards should be aware of it, on the contrary of what happened with previous
efforts (as we have seen above). Going a step further, and actually involving the forest department in
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Formal arrangements give landowners rights to part of the royalties from the net sale
proceeds from log extraction operations. De facto, they obtain only a marginal share of
what they are entitled to. Still, a move of the institutional framework towards
co-management would further limit their ability to appropriate royalties from logs
extraction. If the opposition of such influential members of the community would stop the
reform process, as it seems likely, a scheme for compensation should be crafted. For
example, incentives for the conservation and the re-afforestation in the lower part of the
valley (where, as mentioned above, private property rights are well established) could
also be included as a compensation for these losses. The fact that landowners are not
getting much from their formal rights and the fact that their agricultural operations would
benefit of local positive externalities from increased forest cover, should contribute to
their acceptance of reform.
NGOs are willing to and should be partners in the whole reform process. Because of
their interest in forest resources’ conservation and the information and experience that
they have available, they are valuable partners of any reform process. For many NGOs,
this type of activity is functional to the achievements of their goals and their involvement
can increase transparency and checks on the implementation of reform programmes.30
International donors have already shown their interest and willingness to assist and
facilitate the reform process in the forestry sector in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the lack of
success in previous reform efforts may undermine future engagement. Still, international
donors are active in Pakistan and projects involving the management of natural resources
offer them the opportunity of ripping benefits with respect to environmental and poverty
reduction objectives. Furthermore, donors’ could exploit their experience of regulatory
and implementation obstacles to reform that they met in the past. They could, for
example, make their support conditional on ex-ante legal reforms and focus on their
implementation (see also Suleri, 2002). The additional funds that derive from donors’
involvement could be used for the activities to reduce resistance to reform and to
guarantee equitable outcomes.
If the management regime were successfully reformed, members of the local
community that, to a different degree, are involved in illegal logging will suffer a setback
in their economic opportunities. Very often these members of the community are
disadvantaged and in dire economic conditions, hence the reform package should be
complemented with measures supportive of alternative forms of sustainable livelihoods
(see below). In other words, the intervention towards the protection of the natural
resource should contain a social package to prevent its social outcome to be regressive. It

the reform process would give to its members a sense of ownership and the necessary information to
increase compliance.
30
Such NGOs are, for example, IUCN, Sungi, or the WWF.
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can be argued that the previous interventions to reform the forestry sector were
incomplete from this point of view.
The “Timber mafia” bases its operations on the high rents that can be captured because
of the high profitability of illegal trading in wood. A strategy for reducing the potential
rents from illegal extraction would be to liberalise timber trade (see below), i.e. reducing
tariffs and red tape for imported wood, undercutting substantially the size of rents to be
appropriated via illegal logging. Consequently, the level of resources available locally to
facilitate illegal logging will be reduced.

5.3.2 Auxiliary initiatives and federal level reforms
Finally, there are some initiatives that would facilitate the achievement of environmental
and social targets, and some reforms that are necessary conditions for instituting
sustainable management practices for the forest. In this sub-section we provide an
overview of the most important interventions that would facilitate the achievement of
sustainable logging, but many other interventions related to institutional quality and
environmental management in general could be mentioned (e.g. reforms to improve
governance such as the ones proposed by Transparency International, population
planning, land reform, etc).
A key reform and a test for the will of the federal government for protecting the
Pakistani forest is the abolition of all trade barriers on imported wood.31 The domestic
demand for wood cannot be met by the modest forest stands as it was recognised already
in the Forestry Sector Master Plan (Government of Pakistan, 1992). Allowing imports
would simply be the logical consequence of government’s efforts to protect the forest.
Interventions oriented towards the provision of sustainable livelihoods of local
communities should focus both on those who use wood for self-consumption and those
who extract it for commercial purposes. For the locals involved in logging, alternative
social programs providing alternative sources of income should be set up. For all the
households, their timber use could be reduced with the use of more efficient stoves and
similar technical solutions (e.g. promoting the construction of micro-hydels).32
Payments for environmental services can be another way of financing the conservation
of forests. Since Swat’s forests provide economic benefits (e.g. watershed protection of
31

Opening the Pakistani borders to timber trade would imply increasing pressure on international
markets and, possibly, also increasing illegally harvested timber in neighbouring countries. While we
recognise issues related to unsustainable and illegal logging in world markets, reforms and
interventions at the global level (which we strongly support) are beyond the scope of this study.
32
Pakistani and International NGOs operating in Pakistan have experiences with such programs and
could be instrumental in implementing them within the forestry sector reform (e.g. see World Health
Organization, 2005).
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agricultural activities and hydropower generation), a quantification of the major benefits
could lead to the implementation of a scheme where members of upstream local
communities are paid in order to preserve the forest. In economic terms, the positive
externality will be internalised (for an overview see Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
Some room could be available for the crime and punishment approach, when the state
agencies in charge of enforcement are reliable and they are not likely to get involved in
corruption. The one body of Pakistan’s security forces that has been praised for its
honesty is the motorway police (Transparency International, 2003). This force could
enforce restrictions on the movement of logs on the main roads of Pakistan. Even though
the motorway police can be considered a reliable enforcement agency, it is worth noticing
that the courts that would judge complaints arising from the operations of this force do
not share such a remarkable score on corruption.

6. CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis shows that corruption is contributing to the failure of the management
regime of Pakistani forest and highlights the shortcomings of the standard reform
approaches to corruption. The most invoked reform options with respect to corruption are
the ‘crime and punishment approach’ and the ‘holistic approach’. The ‘crime and
punishment’ approach requires sound enforcement institutions, which are not available in
Pakistan. In our study, we saw that the insistence of Pakistani legislators on the former
approach is at the root of present failures. Furthermore, the sweeping reforms required to
introduce transparency in the Pakistan administration, the ‘holistic approach’, are at odds
with embedded routines and vested interests. These comprehensive reforms remain a
valuable social objective, but cannot provide timely solutions for the issues analyzed here.
Corruption problems, when the overall institutional environment is weak, are best
addressed by local institutional change. In a sector and in a region that are marked by low
administrative capabilities to enforce state regulations, reforms should be aiming at
reducing the coercive role of state agencies. Therefore, options where responsibilities in
forest management are (at least partially) devolved to local communities should be at the
centre stage of reform efforts.
In contrast with what suggested here, the latest developments in the management of
forest in Pakistan are increasing the enforcement effort and powers of state agencies. We
find that the emphasis on state enforcement agencies is misplaced and is reproducing the
conditions of present failures. A carefully crafted reform program should include the
strengthening of property rights, provisions for communal management and market based
incentives, depending on the social, economic, and ecological characteristics of the
different areas under consideration. These objectives should be endorsed by coalitions of
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actors empowered as to be able to enforce these propositions. State agencies should act as
facilitators of the process rather than attempt to exert complete control over the forest.
Ultimately, the relevant question is whether it is possible to save the remaining forest
of Swat through reforms in the forest sector. The arguments presented in this article
provide support for the existence of viable alternatives to unsustainable logging, but
significant changes in the way the problem is dealt with by Pakistani authorities have to
take place in order to achieve them.

APPENDIX: SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN THE STUDY
This study is a part of the Poverty Reduction and Environmental Management (PREM)
research program (http://www.prem-online.org/). During our study we collected
information from secondary sources, from individual interviews, from group discussions
and from a household survey, we held during the fieldwork. The interviewees were
informed agents: forest officials, a conservator, international donors, national and
international NGOs, lawyers, students of history, councils of the elders, and landowners.
Interviews were in some cases individual and in some other in the form of focused group
discussions. Further information was collected from 400 household surveys in the Swat
district and from meetings in villages. Households’ information on economic and social
conditions, and income dependence on natural resources. Village socio-economic profiles
were drawn after the visits. The fieldwork took place between January and August 2005.
A summary of the findings and the methodology applied in the project is available in Rafi
Khan et al., 2006 and an outline of the conceptual framework used in the analysis is
available in Pellegrini and Kruseman, 2005.
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